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The Indiana Supreme Court
Lecture:
THE RULE THAT ISN'T A RULE - THE
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Douglas M. Branson*

I. INTRODUCTION
The much misunderstood business judgment rule is not a "rule" at
all. It has no mandatory content. It involves no substantive "do' s" or

"don' ts" for corporate directors or officers. Instead, it is a standard of
judicial review, entailing only slight review of business decisions.

Alternatively, it could be called a standard of non-review, entailing no
review of the merits of a business decision corporate officials have
made.'

Various commentators' comments to the contrary, mostly based
upon one celebrated (or lamented) Delaware decision, 2 strictly speaking,
the standard of care applicable to corporate directors remains due care.

As the Model Business Corporation Act and the Indiana statute phrase it,
a director is to discharge her duties "with the care an ordinarily
reasonably prudent person in a like position would exercise under
similar circumstances." 3 The standard of conduct is not "slight care," or
"gross negligence," or anything other than due care.4

'W. Edward Sell Chair in Law, University of Pittsburgh. B.A., University of Notre Dame;
J.D., Northwestern University; LLM., University of Virginia. This Article is based upon
the Indiana Supreme Court Lecture, delivered by the author at Valparaiso University
School of Law on September 20, 2001. The author thanks the Supreme Court of Indiana for
the support for legal education evinced by the Supreme Court Lecture program in
Indiana's four law schools. The author thanks Justices Frank Sullivan, Jr., and Robert D.
Rucker for attending the lecture and for their comments and questions. The author wishes
further to thank Dean Jay Conison and Professor Paul H. Brietzke for hospitality that
exceeded all expectations.
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§§ 7.01-720

(1993).

Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (discussed further throughout).
3
REv. MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr § 8.30 (1984) (hereinafter RMBCA); IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1

(1989).
4

See, e.g., Theroit v. Bourg, 691 So. 2d 213, 222 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that "the
applicable standard is that set forth by the plain language" of Louisiana's version of
RMBCA § 8.30, and that adoption of a gross negligence standard would amount to
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But who cares? Many do, because in the modem era the number of
temporal occasions at which the business rule ex ante becomes the
yardstick for directors in shaping their decision-making processes, or ex
post the yardstick by which courts and litigants review (or do not review)
directors' decisions, have multiplied. The uses to which the rule may be
put, and the temporal stages at which it may be encountered, either in
transactional settings or in litigation, have proliferated, often to the
detriment of those who would be critical of corporate conduct.
The business judgment rule is multi-faceted. Most generally, the
business judgment rule acts as a presumption in favor of corporate
managers' actions. Stronger still, the rule provides a safe harbor that
makes both directors and their actions unassailable if certain
prerequisites have been met. In litigation, the rule is a means for
conserving judicial resources, thereby permitting courts to avoid being
mired down in rehashing decisions that are inherently subjective and ill
suited for judges, as opposed to business men and women. Last of all,
the rule is the law's implementation of broad economic policy, built
upon economic freedom and the encouragement of informed risk taking.
Newer uses to which the business judgment rule may be put include
the means by which boards of directors adopt takeover defenses and by
which, after the fact, courts review the adoption of those defenses when
disgruntled shareholders pursue litigation. Another newer use is as a
means by which corporations and their attorneys evaluate and, based
upon that evaluation, recommend that courts dismiss derivative
litigation.
Yet another use to which the business judgment rule may be put is as
a teaching tool. I impress upon law students their future roles as
"process engineers." By placing a premium upon the process that
directors follow to reach a decision, rather than the resulting decision
itself, the business judgment rule serves as a vibrant illustration of
process engineering and the attorney's role in it.
Moreover, the
business judgment rule and the roles it may play are not limited to the
corporate boardroom. The business judgment rule and good process are
a part of "institutions law," useful to the attorney advising a

"impermissible judicial negation of the legislature's acts"); Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the
Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business
Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REv. 591, 604, 617-23 (1983) (lamenting courts' and commentators'
proclivity fully to collapse the standard of conduct into the business judgment rule).
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neighborhood association, a PTA, or a faculty or faculty committee, as
well as a corporation' s board of directors.
Apropos of the business judgment rule' s currency, prior to 1990 no

Indiana decision parsed the business judgment rule.5 Subsequent to
1990, no less than four Indiana appellate court decisions have dealt with

various elements of the rule.6 And, except for Delaware, the Indiana

experience would be representative of the experience in most of the
incorporating jurisdictions in the United States.

One last curiosity to be noted before delving into the rule itself is
that, despite the vastly increased invocations of the rule in the modem
era, the business judgment rule remains uncodified. With one exception,
it is purely a product of judge-made law. 7 It also remains an exclusively
American legal construct, again with one exception. The exception is
Australia, which, in 1999, based upon a well-known United States
formulation of the rule,8 enacted the first, and to this author's
knowledge, the only, statutory version of the business judgment rule. 9

Without further salutation, then, the time has come for more closely
examining the business judgment rule and parsing its elements.

5

Westlaw Search, IN Database, September 14, 2001, on file with the Valparaiso University
Law Review.
See G & N Aircraft v. Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227 (Ind. 2001); Cutshall v. Barker, 733 N.E.2d
973 (Ind. CL App. 2000); Brare v. Roth, 590 N.E.2d 587 (nd. Ct. App. 1992); Krukemeier v.
Krukemeier Mach. & Tool Co., 551 N.E.2d 885 (Ind.Ct. App. 1990).
7 The statutory codification of the standard of conduct, as in RMBCA 8.30, is not the
business judgment rule, as the RMBCA commentary makes clea.
The elements of the business judgment rule and the circumstances for
6

its application are continuing to be developed by the courts. Section
8.30 does not try to codify the business judgment rule or to delineate
the differences between that defensive rule and the section's standards
of director conduct Section 830 deals only with standards of conduct
- the level of performance expected of every director...
3 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN., §8.30 official cmt., 8-161, at 8-163 (3d ed. 1984) (Supp. 1999).
Nonetheless, at least two Indiana cases read the Indiana standard of conduct, IND. CODE
§ 23-1-35-1 (ay & (b), or the limitation of director liability for damages, IND. CODE § 23-1-351(e), which is based upon the Revised Model Act language, as a legislative codification of
the business judgment rule. See G & N Aircraft, 743 N.E.2d at 239; Krukemeier, 551 N.E.2d at
888.
s AMERICAN LAW INsTuTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (1994) (hereinafter ALI CORP. Gov. PROJ.).
9 See AUSTRALIAN CORPORATIONS ACT § 180(2) (1999) ("Business judgment rule").
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II. Do NOT CONFUSE PoucY BASES OR THE EFFECr OF THE RULE wrrH THE
RULE ITSELF

Courts are among the major perpetrators of this common error.
"Courts," one venerable court stated, will not review "an honest mistake
of business judgment."1 0 This economium is a statement of the result of
the rule, not the rule itself.
A similar statement is that "[dlirectors of a commercial corporation
may take chances, the same kind of chances that a man would take in his
own business."1 1 This statement describes more a policy basis for the
rule rather than the rule itself, or the rule stated in any helpful analytical
way.
Yet another court recited, in a manner similar to the venerable court
first quoted above: "[o]rdinarily neither the directors nor the other
officers of a corporation are liable for mere mistakes or errors of
judgment."12
I. COMMON FORMULATIONS OF THE RULE
There are really only two formulations of the rule with wide
currency: the Delaware business judgment rule and the American Law
Institute (ALI) formulation.
Although not without its critics,13 the ALI formulation seems to be a
14
good one and has been adopted by the highest courts of several states.
It states:
(c) A director or officer who makes a business
judgment in good faith fulfills the [duty of care] if the
director or officer:
(1) is not interested in the subject of his business
judgment;

' 0 Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec., 140 A. 264,267 (Del. 1927).
11Ski Roundtop, Inc. v. Hall, 658 P.2d 1071,1078 (Mont. 1983).
12 Nursing Home Bldg. Corp. v. DeHart, 535 P.2d 137,143-44 (Wash. Ct App. 1975).
13 See, e.g., William J. Carney, Section 4.01 of the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance
Project: Restatement or Misstatement?, 66 WASH. U. LQ. 239, 271-88 (1988).
14
See, e.g., Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Conn. 1994); Omnibank
v. United S. Bank, 607 So. 2d 76,85 (Miss. 1992); Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042,104546 (Pa. 1997).
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(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the
business judgment to the extent the director or officer
reasonably believes to be appropriate under the
circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is
in the best interests of the corporation. s
In shorthand, a director and her decision are protected from legal
attack if: first, she and her colleagues made a judgment or decision;
second, the decision makers were free from disabling conflicts of interest;
third, they exercised some (not necessarily reasonable) care in informing
themselves about the matter decided; and fourth, they had a rational (not
necessarily reasonable) basis for the decision they made.
One function of the rule is as a conservator of judicial resources. If
the rule required "reasonable" care or a "reasonable" basis for every
decision, courts would have to hold plenary hearings (trials) because it is
in those fora that questions of reasonableness are decided. The rule
would not serve its function. Instead, if other prerequisites are present
(proactive directors making a decision, freedom from conflicts of
interest, and so on), the defending directors need demonstrate only some
(slight) care and only a rational (plausible) basis for the decision made.
Delaware courts state the rule more succinctly and in the language of
a "presumption." Thus, the business judgment rule is "a presumption
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company."l'
Delaware courts look for the same elements as do other courts: a
judgment or decision, some care, and good faith (absence of conflicts of
interest or base motive). The difference is, because of the use of
presumption, in Delaware, a plaintiff shareholder has the burden of
going forward. The challenging shareholder must demonstrate that the
collegial body (the board) was infected by conflicts of interests on the
part of a critical group (although perhaps less than a majority) of

15 ALI CORP. Gov. PROj., supranote

8, § 4.01(c).
16 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (DeL 1984). The Aronson court's statement of the
rule is the one most quoted by Delaware courts, eclipsing the earlier precedent of Warshaw
v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966), which contained similar, but not identical,
phrasing.
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directors. 17 Or the shareholder might offer credible proof that the
directors merely rubber-stamped the Chief Executive Officer' s (CEO' s)
decision, and thus had not made a judgment or decision of their own.18
By contrast, the ALI version is a safe harbor. The directors have the
burden of establishing the presence of the rule' s elements. Once they do
so, however, the payoff is greater. The director will have sailed into an
impregnable harbor. On the other hand, presumptions may be upset,
meaning perhaps that the directors will have to go through the ordeal of
a trial in order to vindicate themselves. 19
There are outlier formulations here and there. In the late 1980s and
early 1990s, when seemingly every savings and loan in Texas had failed
and all of their directors were being sued, Texas courts used the business
judgment rule to protect those directors: "Texas courts to this day will
not impose liability upon a non-interested corporate director unless the
challenged transaction is ultra vires or tainted by fraud.... Such is the
business judgment rule in Texas."2 0 Such a statement has two faults.
One is that it seems to be another statement of the result of the rule,
rather than the rule itself. A second is that it protects directors who did
nothing. More astute courts recognize that the business judgment rule
does not protect complete absences of care. Directors completely asleep
at the switch do not enjoy the rule' s protection.21 They must go to trial
17 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 Aid 345, 363-65 (Del. 1993) (noting that the factual
question is how much self-dealing or other conflicts taint "the collective independence of
the board").
1s See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A2d 858 (DeL 1985) (finding breach of duty where
the directors made decision to sell company after two-hour meeting, called on short notice
with no documents or written analyses whatsoever, rubber-stamping the decision of an
aged CEO who wanted to sell the company and retire).
19 See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (comparing presumptions versus safe
harbors). At least two of the four recent Indiana decisions cite and rely on the Delaware
cases, especially Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), and the business judgment rule
as a presumption analysis. See aso G & N Aircraft v. Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227, 238 (id.
2001); Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E.2d 587,591-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
2 Resolution Trust Co. v. Norris, 830 F. Supp. 351, 356 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (quoting Gearhart
Indus. v. Smith Int'l, 741 F2d 707,721 (5th Cir. 1984)); see also FDIC v. Brown, 812 F. Supp.
722, 724 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
21 Statutes in Virginia, Wisconsin, and Indiana modify the standard of conduct itself,
providing that the director with a warm heart but empty head cannot be held liable. See,
e.g., IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(e) (1989) (no money damage liability for directors unless found
to have engaged in "willful misconduct or recklessness"); Wc. STAT. ANN. § 180.307 (West
Supp. 2001) (similar). In Brane, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the modified
standard should not be applied retroactively, affirming liability of directors of a grain
elevator for their complete failure to hedge grain purchases by futures transactions. 590
N.E.2d at 590.
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where they will have to establish that they exercised not only some care,
but due care.
IV. FURTHER POUCY BASES FOR THE RULE
The "good" governance movement of the last fifteen or so years
contemplates a board comprised of a super majority of truly
independent directors, that is, non-insiders who are free of any
significant financial or even social ties to the senior executives. 22 Today,
even traditional candidates for board service, such as the trusted outside
lawyer, investment banking firm partner, or commercial banker, are
considered non-independent and are becoming a rarity of sorts on
boards of directors.
The business judgment rule now more than ever is necessary to
encourage truly independent persons to serve as directors. APersons of
reason, intellect and integrity would not serve if the law exacted from
them a degree of prescience not possessed by others."2 3 Once on the
board, a strong business judgment rule is necessary to encourage those
independent directors to engage in the type of informed risk taking that
is essential to business success.
Returning to the judicial point of view, courts are ill-equipped to
review business decisions. Those decisions often involve intangibles,
intuitive insights or surmises as to business matters such as competitive
outlook, cost structure, and economic and industry trends. Business
decisions often come down to matters of touch and feel not susceptible to
systematic analysis.
Courts may also buttress their non-involvement with a statutory
argument. Corporate statutes universally provide that it is the board of
directors, and not the court, who is to manage or supervise the
management of the corporation' s business and affairs.24
Last of all, as previously mentioned, a policy behind the rule is
conservation of the judicial resource. The business judgment rule is a

22 See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, CorporateGovemance "Refjrm" and the New Corporate Social

Responsibility, 62 U. Prnr. L REv. 605, 627 (2001) (describing "good governance movement").
2 Samuel Arsht, The Business ludgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSRA L REV. 93,97 (1979).
24 See, e.g., RMBCA, supra note 3, § 8.01 ("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or

under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed under the
direction of, [the] board of directors .... ").
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filter that enables courts to easily screen out non-meritorious challenges
to the actions of directors and executives.
V. RELATIONSHIP TO THE STANDARD OF CONDUCr

The standard of conduct is due care. It is not slight care or gross
negligence. With that established, the business judgment rule may be
the de facto standard of conduct in cases in which directors are proactive,
making a judgment or decision, that may be a deliberative decision to
take no action, as opposed to cases of complete nonfeasance.
The last policy reason leads nicely to a hypothetical showing how
the rule and the standard of conduct might play off one another. After a
shareholder suit is filed, the directors and the corporation might file a
motion for summary judgment. They could attach thereto an affidavit
by the Chief Financial Officer stating that she had prepared and
distributed a written report on the pros and cons of the decision to be
made, an affidavit by a director stating that the board met and received
an oral report from another senior executive or outside consultant, and a
copy of the board resolution, certified by the corporate secretary as a true
and correct copy of the resolution contained in the minutes of the board
meeting. The court would examine such affidavit evidence. The
business judgment rule requires only some care, so the court need not
review the decision-making process on a plenary basis. The court might
then grant the defense motion.
Suppose, however, that the plaintiff alleges with particularity why a
critical mass of directors had an interest in the subject matter of the
board decision. In that case, the court would deny the defense motion
for summary judgment
Loss of the motion, however, does not translate into perdition for the
directors or their decision. It means merely that the judge will hold the
case over for trial. At trial, the defendant directors might assert again the
business judgment rule defense, although the judge may say that the
court's earlier ruling is the law of the case on that score. Then the
directors would ask that the decision-making process be reviewed on a
plenary basis because they contend that they have met the standard of
conduct, that is, they exercised not only some care but due care. They
may also assert other defenses, such as a lack of causation, a superceding
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cause, 25 or that the corporation had suffered no legally cognizable
damage. 26
VI. COMPONENTS OF THE RULE - THERE MUST HAVE BEEN A DECISION OR

JUDGMENT

Sometimes it is said that there must be an independent judgment or
decision. Rubber-stamping the CEO's or controlling shareholder's
wish or command will not do. One of the classic cases involved a
shareholder contention that, when the directors of the Chicago Cubs
baseball club voted to uphold majority owner P.K. Wrigley' s decision to
have no lights and therefore no night baseball, those directors were
merely implementing Wrigley's inveterate belief that God meant
baseball to be a game played in the daytime. According to the plaintiff

minority shareholder, the reasoning given by the directors - that night
baseball would ruin the neighborhood surrounding Wrigley Field - was
pretextual.27 Nonetheless, the illinois court afforded business judgment
rule protection to the Chicago Cubs' board of directors and its decision.

A decision to make no decision is also a judgment or decision for
purposes of the rule' s application.2 8 Veteran directors, though, say that
boards often act by consensus and that consensus builds by a process of
accretion. A requirement that matters be put to motions and votes

encourages confrontation. It forces boards to act like legislative bodies
or, worse yet, like faculty meetings at colleges and universities.
The business judgment rule' s emphasis on the process leading to
formal judgments also constitutes make-work for lawyers who, as
process engineers, come to have a larger role than they should have in

the board room. Similarly, critics of the modem business judgment rule
say that insistence on formal decisions places a premium on play acting

See, e.g., BRANSON, supra note 1, §§ 6.11-6.14 (1993).
- Id. § 6.14.
2

2

7Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (I1. Ct App. 1968); see also McMullin v. Beran, 765
A.2d 910, 916-20, 924 (DeL 2000) (finding that directors of subsidiary were not entitled to
business judgment rule protection because they delegated their decision to a parent
corporation when they themselves "had an ultimate statutory duty and fiduciary
responsibility to make an informed and independent decision"); Miller v Schreyer, 683
N.Y.S.2d 51, 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (explaining that "where the wrong alleged is inaction
of the board rather than a conscious decision . . . the business judgment rule is
inapplicable").
n2See, e.g., Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E.2d 587, 592 (Ind.Ct. App. 1992) ("Mhe rule does not
protect directors who have abdicated their position or absent a conscious decision, failed to

act.").
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and on paper trails. It does not improve the quality of decisions that are
made.
VII. COMPONENTS OF THE RULE - THE JUDGMENT OR DEcIsION MUST BE AN
INFORMED ONE

Again, the requirement is some care, not due care. This is what the
Supreme Court of Delaware meant in Smith v.Von Gorkom 29 when it
stated that "[w] e think the concept of gross negligence is also the proper
standard for determining whether a business judgment reached by a
board of directors was an informed one." 30 That is, the statement upon
which arch-conservative commentators rest their argument that in the
modem era, the standard of conduct has changed across the board to
gross negligence or slight care, rather than due care. 31
One noted commentator has urged that the standard to be applied
should be a subjective standard. That is, did the directors making the
decision reasonably believe that they possessed sufficient information?32
An alternative phrasing that asks how much information is enough
information, or what information gathering mechanisms (consultants,
committees, reports) are sufficient, is itself a matter of business
judgment.
A recent judicial pronouncement in Delaware that goes part of the
way toward those commentators' urging is that "[tihe Board is
responsible for considering only material facts that are reasonablyavailable,
not those that are immaterial or out of the Board' s reasonable reach."33
The court' s use of the words "reasonably available" and "reasonable
reach" indicate that an objective - rather than wholly subjective standard is still in place.

- 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
30Smith, 488 A.2d at 873.

31One of the most arch of the arch-conservatives has been a St. Louis practitioner, Charles
Hansen, who asserted over and over in ALI meetings that the standard of conduct is gross
negligence or lower. See, e.g., Charles Hansen, The AU CorporateGovernance Project: Of the
Duty of Due Care and the Business Judgment Rule, 41 BUS. LAW. 1237,1241 (1986).
32 See Joseph Hinsey IV, Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's Corporate
Governance Project: The Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L REv. 609, 613-14
(1984).
33 Brehem v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 (DeL 2000), rev'g in part In re The Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Clh 1998).
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VIII. COMPONENTS OF THE RULE - ABsENCE OF DISABING CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST

Conflicts that disable and those that do not are at the antipodes of a
spectrum. At the disabling antipode are direct pecuniary interests of the
director, her family or associates, or an affiliate of the director, in the
judgment or decision for which the rule' s protections are sought.
Yet receipt of normal directors' fees, or the desire to retain them,
does not disable. In Marx v. Akers,34 the New York Court of Appeals held
that, as a matter of law, the prospect of receipt of future directors' fees in
the amount of $80,000 per year did not disable IBM's directors from
setting those fees. A promise of continuation on the board after a change
in control does not disable. Receipt by an investment banking firm of
$229,000 in annual fees did not disable the firm' s partner from sitting on
Chevron' s board and participating in a decision in which the firm had
rendered advice.35 That a director was the former neighbor of a senior
executive of the corporation on the other side of a transaction did not
disable: conclusionary allegations of "personal affinity" are insufficient
to establish director interest of lack of independence.36
By contrast, receipt by a director of an undisclosed $150,000 finder' s
fee did disable that director. 37 The further question, however, was
whether the taint of self-interest on the part of some directors infected a
decision made by directors who were not disabled.
When a critical mass of directors also wore second hats as well-paid,
long term consultants, hired and fired by the controlling shareholder,
their decision was held not entitled to business judgment rule
protection.3 8 Bank directors who circumvented local banking laws by
forming a "competing loan company" were not entitled to the rule' s
protection for that decision because they accepted management fees
from the loan company.39
Few universal principles may be stated. One may be that so-called
structural bias, that is, the predilection of directors to favor those of the
same social or economic class, such as fellow directors or senior

-3 666 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y. 1996).
Katz v. Chevron Corp., 22 Cal. App. 4th 13521368 (1994).
6
Odyssey Partners v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386,409-10 (Del. Ch. 1999).
37

Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345,362 (DeL 1993).
Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49,52-53 (5th Cir. 1980).

38Clark v.
39

Warren v. Century Bankcorporation Inc., 741 P.2d 846, 848 (Okla. 1987).
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managers, in the eyes of most courts does not disable. The argument is
frequently made in the context of special litigation committees'
recommendations that derivative suits not go forward against fellow
directors. The "there but for the grace of God go I" motivation that may
lurk behind a decision that litigation is not in the corporation' s best
interests, while real, is not, generally speaking, legally cognizable.
Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution, and also a subliminal
recognition of the structural bias problem, most boards staff special
litigation committees with new "expansion" directors who can in no way
be alleged to have any connection with the wrongdoing alleged and
against whom the structural bias argument has less force.
Another universal principle is that if a single decision-maker seeks
the protection of the business judgment rule she must, "like Caesar's
wife, be above reproach."40
A sub-species of the conflict of interest species is the dominated
director case. Rather than a discernable pecuniary interest, what is
alleged is that the director is beholden generally to a controlling
shareholder or CEO, thus being disabled by his lack of independence. A
plaintiff making such an argument faces an uphill battle. Courts are
loathe to find that an otherwise reputable business person is not his or
her own person. Courts would rather rely on an identifiable pecuniary
interest to ground a finding that a particular decision maker was
disabled. Nonetheless, the cases do succeed from time to time. A five
person board staffed by outside counsel, inside counsel, and a corporate
employee, all of whom were beholden to the controlling shareholder,
who occupied the fourth board slot, was found by the Ohio Supreme
41
Court to have been dominated.
By contrast, if counsel and other advisers scrub the board clean,
removing all inferences of conflicts or of board domination, and then
those non-executive, independent directors, convening in executive
session, run the decision-making process from start to finish, their
decision is entitled not only to business judgment rule protection, but
also to heightened business judgment rule protection.42 What that means
analytically is hard to say, and it may only be a word choice for

Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 430 (Del. Ch. 1997) (quoting Lewis v. Fuqua, 502
A.2d 962. 967 (Del. CL 1985)).
1 Gries Sports Enter. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., 496 N.E.2d 959,968 (Ohio 1986).
4 See, e.g., Ivanhoe Pship v. Newrnont Mining Co., 535 A.2d 1334,1343 (Del. 1987).
40

4
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emphasis. The result though is clear. The decision made will be very
nearly unassailable if the rule' s other elements are met.
IX. COMPONENTS OF THE RULE - A RATIONAL BASIS FOR THE DECISION
Directors could be free of disabling - indeed, all - conflicts or
domination, gather voluminous information, digest, and make not only
an unwise, but an off-the-wall decision. Under the ALI version, such a
decision would not be entitled to business judgment rule protection. A
decision to put a man on Mars, or to accept not only a lower but clearly
inferior bid for the company, might be judgments lacking a rational
basis.43
On this score, some judges and commentators say that directors are
not liable unless their decision or judgment was manifest folly. Others
say that directors' decisions are unassailable unless they amount to a
gross abuse of discretion. Those phrasings may be too permissive. By
contrast, the statement that "all directorial decisions must have a sound
business purpose" goes too far in the other direction.
During deliberations at ALI annual meetings, many members,
especially older members, thought that the "rational" basis requirement
differed little from a "reasonable" basis. They entreated the ALI
reporters to find another phrasing, as they were certain that the rational
basis requirement would be an invitation to prolonged litigation. This
author, however, has been teaching the ALI business judgment rule to
large classes of law students since 1980. Almost without dissent, those
students see ample cleavage between the "rational basis" standard and
the much more exacting "reasonable basis" standard.
One esteemed commentator, and also no less an authority than exDelaware Chancellor, William Allen, both deny that any rational basis
requirement exists, at least as part of the Delaware version of the rule.44
Professor Lyman Johnson observes that a rational basis standard would
lead judges astray, from examining the soundness of the decisionmaking process, to an examination of the decision itself. Chancellor

4

3See, e.g., Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A.2d 599, 610 (Del. Ch.), affd., 316 Al2d 619 (Del.
1974) ("There are limits on the business judgment rule which fall short of intentional or
inferred fraudulent misconduct and which are based simply on gross inadequacy of
price."); cf. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1990)
(decision to accept dearly inferior bid in merger of equals entitled to business judgment
rule protection).
44
See Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 Bus. LAW. 625,632-33 (2000).
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Allen reached the same conclusion based on his reading of countless
Delaware decisions. 45
X. COMPONENTS OF THE RULE - UMBRELLA REQUIREMENT (BROODING
OMNIPRESENCE) OF GOOD FAITH

In a transactional setting, an attorney advising a board might run
through the rule' s elements as a checklist judgment or decision, absence
of disabling conflicts, some care, and a rational basis. She would then do
well to pause, raise her head, and sniff - loudly and several times. All
good lawyers apply a "smell test." Even if all of the law' s formal
requirements have been met, if the deal under consideration does not
feel right, or smell right, they do not do the deal, or at least they advise
postponement until they dig down to the source of their olfactory
concern.

In the business judgment rule context, the umbrella requirement of
good faith is a surrogate of sorts for a smell test. It also has particular
utility in two more delimited areas.

One is when the decision-making process has been infected by illicit
motives other than pecuniary conflicts. Revenge, spite, jealousy, or other

base motives may be behind a decision. In such a case, lack of good faith
would be the proper means by which to attack the decision.46
Another is knowing approval of illegal conduct. Directors who
approved forgiveness of indebtedness by a political party when the
forgiveness was tantamount to an illegal campaign contribution were not
entitled to protection, even though they had no personal conflicts and
they had a rational basis for the decision made.47

re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del. Ch. 1996); cf.
Parnes v. Bally Entm't Corp., 722 A.2d 1243,1246 (Del. 1999) ("The presumptive validity of
a business judgment is rebutted in those rare cases where the decision under attack is 'so
far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any
ground other than bad faith."').
4
6 See, e.g., In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 1989 WL 7036 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31,1989).
The court stated:
Greed is not the only human emotion that can pull one from the path
of propriety; so might hatred, lust, envy, revenge, or... shame or
pride. Indeed any human emotion may cause a director to place his
own interests, preferences or appetites before the welfare of the
corporation.
Id. at "15.
47 See Miller v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
45 See In
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A recent decision stated that directors who knowingly or
deliberately withhold material information from the board in order to
mislead shareholders lack good faith. Under such circumstances the
shroud of protection otherwise afforded by the business judgment rule
would fall to the ground. 48 Another recent case held that a cryptic and
peremptory refusal of a derivative action plaintiff' s demand, in a case of
obvious wrongdoing, constituted a lack of good faith. The court could
thus look into the merits of demand denial itself.49
The good faith requirement is something of a catch-all. It also
demonstrates the flexibility of the business judgment rule. For example,
in a dominated directors' case, a court could alternatively find that the
directors rubber-stamped the decision of a controlling shareholder and
made no judgment or decision, that the directors lacked independence,
or that the directors lacked the required good faith. In nearly every
business judgment rule case, then, judges have a number of "outs,"
although in their wisdom judges may choose not use them. This is as it
should be because, first and foremost, the business judgment rule is a
judicial construct, born out of judges' realizations about limitations on
their abilities, about conservation of the judicial resource, and about their
proper role in business cases.
XI. PRESUMPTION OR PREREQUISITE?

Delaware courts - and courts in jurisdictions that follow Delaware
law - phrase the business judgment rule as a "presumption" that "in
making a decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis and in good faith." 5° In his treatise, the late Professor Ed Cleary
found that no concept in the law of evidence was more slippery than the
concept of presumption, save perhaps the concept of burden of proof.
Professor Cleary found no less than eight meanings courts have given to
"presumption." 5'

4 Potter v. Pholad, 560 N.E.2d 388, 395 (Minn. CL App. 1997) (applying Delaware law from
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 1995 WL 600881, at *7 (Del. Ch. September 2Z 1995)).
49
Harhen v. Brown, 710 N.E.2d 224, 234-36 (Mass. Ct. App.), rev'd, 730 N.E.2d 859 (Mass.

2000).
s See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text (discussing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805
(Del. 1984)).
31 EDWARD W. CLEARY, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342 (3d ed. 1984).
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The most frequent understanding of presumption is the Thayerian,
or "bursting bubble," theory of presumptions.5 2 That is to say, a party's
proof of circumstances A, B, and C (here, a judgment or decision, by duly
elected directors, who exercised some care) leads to a presumption of the
ultimate fact, D (here, that reasonable care was in fact exercised). If the
opposing party can poke a hole in the foundational facts (conflict of
interest, were woefully under-informed, and so on), then the bubble
bursts and the presumption of the ultimate fact dissipates or, indeed,
evaporates altogether. This theory of presumption predominates in
American law and is the version the Federal Rules of Evidence
adopted. 3
When Delaware and other courts use the language of presumption,
they seem blissfully unaware of what the law of evidence teaches us
about presumptions. Perhaps they are articulating some other nonThayerian view of presumption when, in a case or two, they have
4
referred to the business judgment rule as a "powerful presumption."5
I doubt it. Instead I think that Delaware jurists have given the
bursting bubble theory very little thought. And, that lack of deliberation
is of no moment in Delaware. Delaware courts require more than a pin
prick - indeed, much, much more - before finding that the presumption

of due care set up by application of the rule vanishes.
For example, in In re Wait Disney Company Derivative Litigation,3 the
Delaware chancellor reviewed the payment of a $140 million severance
package to a crony of CEO Michael Eisner who had served less than a
year as corporate president and who had demonstrated a singular lack of
accomplishment (many would say outright malfeasance) in the position.
Nonetheless, the directors approved a "no fault" termination, triggering
payment of the severance. The directors who approved included Eisner,
three corporate officers beholden to Eisner, the principal of the grammar
school Eisner's children attended, the president of the university Eisner's
children attended, Eisner's personal architect, and Eisner's personal
attorney. If ever a plaintiff pricked and burst a bubble on lack-ofindependence grounds, the plaintiffs did in Disney. Nonetheless, the
52

JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW

314 (1898). Thayer was an eminent Harvard Law School lecturer on evidence and other
subjects around the turn of the twentieth century.
S See FED. R. EVID. 301; CLEARY, supra note 51, at 974-75.

-4 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 Ai2d 345,361 (DeL Ch. 1993).
55 731 A.2d 342 (DeL Ch. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del.

2000).
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Delaware Court refused to review the merits of the no fault termination
decision, applying the business judgment rule.
Delaware courts' lack of deliberation on the use and misuse of
presumptions may be of little significance in Delaware but could affect
outcomes elsewhere. The courts of many states, including Indiana, look
to Delaware case law in processing corporate law cases. 6 Blending the
Delaware business judgment rule with the accepted wisdom about
presumptions, other state courts could come to a result opposite that
which Delaware courts would reach, holding corporate directors over for
trial on breach of duty of care allegations.
The American Law Institute states its version of the rule as a safe
harbor rather than a presumption. Although the ALI version has been
criticized as a movement from "presumption to prerequisite,"57 the AU
version offers greater protection and clarity than the presumption
formulation of the business judgment rule because the ALI version
requires a greater quantum of proof by directors.
XII. PARTICULAR APPLICATIONS OF THE RULE - DISMISSAL OF DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION

In 1979, both the New York Court of Appeals and the United States
Supreme Court dusted off a few older precedents, finding in them
support for the proposition that a board of directors has power to
terminate derivative litigation bought by a shareholder as not in the
"corporation' s best interests."58 In theory, the concept is sound. Just as
a natural person may do, a corporation should be able to decide not to
stand on legal rights it may have. The difficulty is how, as a fictional
being, the corporation can find its voice for making that decision. This
difficulty is compounded in the typical derivative action because the
defendants are some of the corporate officers and directors, a subgroup
of the group that ordinarily would manage the corporation's business
and affairs and be its voice for determining whether or not to pursue an
action, namely, the corporation' s board of directors.

5 See supra note 19 (discussing Indiana business judgment rule cases relying on leading
Delaware precedent, Aronson v. Lewis). But see infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text
(explaining that Indiana courts may not look to Delaware precedent in takeover area).
57 See, e.g., Carney, supra note 13, at 273.
5 Burks v. Lasker, 441 US. 471 (1979) (finding no federal obstacle in the Investment
Company Act of 1940 if state law, pursuant to which a mutual fund had been organized,
authorized the practice); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979).
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The manner in which the potential conflict of interest came to be
reconciled was through the use of the special litigation committee, or
SLC. If a shareholder brought colorable claims against some of the
directors, counsel would first instruct the board of directors to amend
the corporation's bylaws, increasing the number of directors. Second,
the board would appoint two or three "expansion" directors to the
positions so created who could have had no possible connection to the
alleged wrongdoing and who, in addition, often would be "purer than
the driven snow." Third, the full board would delegate to the committee
all the board' s power to deal with the pending action or shareholder
demand that an action be brought. 9 Once convened, the SLC would
then hire an independent law firm to conduct a factual investigation of
the shareholder's allegations and to research the applicable law. The
firm would report periodically to the SLC and involve SLC members in
the investigation, at least at crucial stages.
In the typical scenario, eight or ten months later the SLC will
promulgate a report, which it files with the court. Appended to the
report will be a voluminous report of the investigation and a legal
memorandum. By motion for summary judgment, the SLC will then ask
the court to dismiss the shareholder action as having been found by the
SLC "not in the corporation' s best interests." Because the SLC has made
a judgment or decision, exercised some care in making that decision,
demonstrated freedom from conflicts of interest, and set forth a very
rational basis for the decision made, the SLC will contend that its
decision is entitled to business judgment rule protection.
The SLC device is accepted everywhere courts have encountered it
Instead, the frontier is what sort of deference, and what sort of review,
courts should give to SLC reports and recommendations. No less than
five positions have been adumbrated.
In several jurisdictions, courts afford the SLC recommendation full
business judgment rule protection. That is, if the SLC members offer an
affidavit or similar proof establishing the elements of the rule, the court
never reviews the merits of the SLC recommendation to dismiss the
action. This is the position adopted by New York in the early case of
Auerbach v. Bennett.60

5 See, e.g., BRANSON, supra note 1, §§ 11.31-11.32.
- 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979); see also, e.g., Hirsch v. Jones Intercable, Inc., 984 P.2d 629, 63738 (CoL 1999); Gray v. Manhattan Med. Ctr., 18 P.3d 291,297 (Kan. App. Ct 2001); Lewis v.
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Other courts, most notably in Delaware, have stated that a decision
to dismiss litigation is qualitatively different from the types of decisions
ordinarily given business judgment rule protection, such as directors'
decisions to make an acquisition or build a new plant. Courts have no
expertise in the latter but they do have expertise - lots of it in fact - on
61
the issue of whether litigation should proceed or be dismissed.

In their discretion, Delaware trial judges (chancellors) may review
the merits of a SLC recommendation, but only in demand excused
cases. 62 Under a North Carolina precedent, in their discretion, trial
courts may review the merits of a recommendation in all cases, demand
refused or demand excused. 63 The Massachusetts precedent requires
trial judges to conduct at least a "smell test" as to the merits of SLC
recommendations in all cases. 64 Last of all, the ALI schematic, adopted
in toto by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, contemplates
discretionary view of a SLC recommendation when directors have been
accused of duty of loyalty violations but non-review when a SLC
recommends that duty of care allegations be dismissed. 6s
XIII. INDIANA'S

BusINEss JUDGMENT RULE

Indiana has codified its choice legislatively. 66 It opts for the Auerbach
v. Bennett standard of non-review. The legislation provides that "[i]f the
[SLCI committee determines that pursuit of a right or remedy through a
derivative proceeding or otherwise is not in the best interest of the
corporation, the merits of that determination shall be presumed to be
conclusive

... ."

A shareholder may challenge the recommendation only

by demonstrating that "[tihe committee was not 'disinterested"' or that
"[t]he committee' s determination was not made after an investigation
conducted in good faith." In other words, a shareholder in an Indiana

Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). Many of the early cases were educated
Ere guesses by federal courts about what they thought state high courts would do. See,
e.g., Gaines v. Houghton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying California law), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1145 (1982); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying California
law); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (applying Michigan law).
61Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779,787-89 (Del. 1980).
62 Such a review is referred to as the "Zapata second step," after the Delaware case by that
name. See supra note 61.
6 Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323 (N.C. 1987).
6
Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 56-57 (Mass. 1990). The Supreme Court of New Jersey
followed Houle in In re PSE & G ShareholderLitig., 718 A.2d 254, 260 (N.J. 1998).
6"See Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 104Z 1049 (Pa. 1997).
- IND. CODE § 23-1-324 (1989).
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corporation may only challenge SLC findings on business judgment rule
grounds and not on the merits of the SLC recommendation itself.
In Cutshall v. Barker,67 the Indiana Court of Appeals reviewed a SLC
recommendation emanating from procedures scripted in accordance
with the Indiana statute. The trial court afforded the SLC determination
business judgment rule protection and dismissed the plaintiff' s claims
in their entirety. The appellate court did not admit even of the
possibility of a review on the merits (or a so-called Zapata second step),
citing and following Auerbach v. Bennett. In so doing, the court tied up a
few loose ends before affirming.
The Cutshal court held that a law firm which represented both the
corporation and the SLC did not lack the independence the cases require.
Because the law firm had been hired in both capacities after suit had
been filed, the law firm had no conceivable connection with the
wrongdoing alleged. Under the SLC precedents, the law firm had the
independence required.
The law firm did not do such a great job. The SLC did not swear any
witnesses and did not transcribe any witness interviews. Most law firms
would advise a SLC to do both. Nonetheless, the Cutshall court found
the investigation to have been conducted in "good faith," as the Indiana
statute and commentary thereto require.6
Indiana's stance and the application of the business judgment rule
in Indiana to SLC recommendations are set firmly in place both by
legislation and an authoritative Court of Appeals decision.
XIV. PARTICULAR APPLICATIONS OF THE RULE - REVIEW OF ADOFTION OF
TAKEOVER DEFENSES

Another type of decision that differs from typical investment or
management decisions, such as whether to develop a new product or
modernize a new plant, is the board' s decision to adopt takeover
defenses or to prefer one competing bidder for a company over other
bidders. Here again, directors should not necessarily have exclusive
jurisdiction. Shareholders should have more of a say with regard to
whether an offer for the company should be entertained or one offer

67 733

N.E.2d 973 (nd. CL App. 2000).

6Mid. at 981-82 (construing IND. CODE § 23-1-324(c) and the Official Comment thereto).
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preferred over another, as opposed to a decision to modernize a plant
At a minimum, jurisdiction should be shared or concurrent
So, again, courts began to use the business judgment rule as the
yardstick. But, as with the review of SLC recommendations to dismiss
derivative actions, courts added on refinements to the business judgment
rule in order to factor in the differing nature of the judgment or decision
under review. Once again, Delaware courts lead the way.
The first refinement of the business judgment rule came in Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.," which sets out a "response phase" business
judgment rule dealing with directors' responses to takeover bids. To
receive business judgment rule protection, the directors adopting a
takeover defense must also have inquired whether a realistic "danger to
corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of another person's
stock ownership." Any defensive measure taken, then, "must be
reasonable in relation to the threat posed." 7° In applying these added
elements, courts are to apply "enhanced scrutiny" to actions directors
have taken, in part because of "the omnipresent specter that [in the
takeover area] a board may be acting primarily in its own interests."7

Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. PolaroidCorp. 2 illustrates what has come to
be known as the "proportionality" add-on to the business judgment rule.
Potential target, Polaroid, stalled a meeting with a friendly acquirer of
shares (Roy Disney) while it installed an employee stock ownership plan,
or ESOP, as a defensive measure. Without even knowing precisely what
the threat posed was, the directors adopted an expensive and drastic
measure. The Delaware vice-chancellor found that the Polaroid directors
had neither adequately informed themselves, as the business judgment
rule requires, nor "undertake[n] the [proportionality] analysis mandated
by Unocal Corp." and the refined business judgment rule that case
promulgates for the takeover area.
A third business judgment rule comes into play in the "auction
phase" of a takeover. In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc.,73 the Delaware Supreme Court held that when it has become
inevitable that a company will be sold or broken up, the "directors' role
changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged
69 493 A.2d 946,954 (DeL 1985).
701d. at 955.
" Id.at 954.
7559 A.2d
7 506 A.2d

257, 271 (DeL CK 1989).
173 (Del. 1986).
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with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company."
Under Delaware precedent, in the auction phase, any defensive
measures undertaken by directors must be a "rationally related benefit to
the shareholders" in order to receive business judgment rule protection.
Thereafter, the Delaware takeover jurisprudence takes several twists
and turns, refining further the application of the business judgment rule
to the takeover area. All those twists and turns are beyond the scope of
this Article.
Suffice it to say that business interests in Indiana did not care for the
developing Delaware jurisprudence. They lobbied for and had the
General Assembly add to the statute's duty of care provision the
following subsection, which is quite unlike anything in any other United
States jurisdiction:
[Tihe general assembly intends to reaffirm certain of...
corporate governance rules to ensure that directors of
Indiana corporations, in exercising their business
judgment, are not required to approve a proposed
corporate action if the directors in good faith determine
...
that such action is not in the best interests of the
corporation. In making such determination, directors
are not required to consider the effects of a proposed
corporate action on any particular corporate constituent
group [i.e., shareholders] or interest as dominant or
74
controlling.
Just in case their intention to negate any application of either Unocal
or Revlon in Indiana was not crystal clear, legislators added in the statute
itself the following:
Certain judicial decisions in Delaware and other
jurisdictions, which might otherwise be looked to for
guidance in interpreting Indiana corporate law,
including decisions relating to potential change of
control transactions that impose a different or higher
degree of scrutiny on actions taken by directors in
response to a proposed acquisition of control of the

- IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(Q (1989).
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corporation, are inconsistent with the proper application
of the business judgment rule under this article.75
Ergo, no Unocal, no Revlon, no enhanced scrutiny, no proportionality
add-on, and no duty to conduct an auction exist in Indiana. Under the
provision enacted in Indiana, if directors adopt a wrong-headed,
scorched earth defense of some sort - on incomplete news that someone
may be acquiring a larger holding of the corporation' s shares - those
directors, their ignorance, and their over-reaction will be protected from
judicial scrutiny by the Indiana version of the business judgment rule.
The provision is a permanent solution to what was a temporary
phenomenon (the takeover boom of the 1980s) and should be repealed.
XV. DoEs INDIANA NEED A BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AT ALL?
The Indiana General Assembly has done such a thorough job of
protecting Indiana directors on all fronts, and not just in the takeover
area, that at first blush Indiana may not even have a business judgment
rule. The reason is that Indiana is one of three or so states that have
adopted a "warm heart, empty head" standard of liability with which to
measure director conduct In Indiana, "[a] director is not liable for any
action taken as a director, or any failure to take action, unless... [tjhe
breach or failure to perform constitutes wilful misconduct or
recklessness." 76 As long as directors had warm and fuzzy feelings in
their chests when they took action, no matter how ill conceived their
inactions or how empty their heads were, they will not be liable. Who
needs a business judgment rule when the standard of liability is so
forgiving?
The answer is that many corporate law actions are fought out at the
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction stages of
litigation. Shareholder plaintiffs seek to enjoin transactions or forestall
meetings at which votes will be taken. The business judgment rule
shields transactions as well as individual directors from full judicial
scrutiny. The business judgment rule therefore remains important even
though a legislative enactment has, by and large, removed the issue of
director liability from the equation.

7Id.
- Id. § 23-1-35-1(e) (1989).
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XVI. CONCLUSION

Indiana is not alone in enacting a permanent solution to temporary
problems such as the takeover boom and the director-officer liability
crisis of the mid-1980s. Since then, however, courts in Delaware have
worked out judicial solutions for many of the perceived problems
Indiana faced.77 As a legal scholar, I am no apologist for, and at times
have been critical of, the Delaware corporate law regime.78 But perhaps
Indiana should repeal some of its enactments so that its courts could
benefit from the rich Delaware takeover jurisprudence.
That then is the business judgment rule - a rule that is not a rule. It is
a great law school teaching tool. In the non-academic world, properly
applied, the rule permits courts to accord to boards of directors the
proper amount of deference to board decisions. Last of all, the rule
provides a schematic for any advisor counseling any collegial group, and
not just a board of directors, to reach a judgment or decision that in all
likelihood will be a sound one.

7 For example, in Parwnmint Communiations, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990),
the court carved out a large exception to the auction duties outlined in Revlon. In a merger
of equals, a target corporation could "just say no" to a third-party takeover bid even if it

were at a superior price and, if challenged in court, that "just say no" response would be
reviewed under the business judgment rule. Id. at 1152-53.
73See, e.g., Douglas M. Brasmi, Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group
Analyss of Corponte Lzo, 43 VAND. L REV. 85 (1990).

